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Abstract
Well-designed adversarial examples can easily fool deep speech
emotion recognition models into misclassifications. The trans-
ferability of adversarial attacks is a crucial evaluation indicator
when generating adversarial examples to fool a new target model
or multiple models. Herein, we propose a method to improve
the transferability of black-box adversarial attacks using lifelong
learning. First, black-box adversarial examples are generated by
an atrous Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model. This
initial model is trained to attack a CNN target model. Then,
we adapt the trained atrous CNN attacker to a new CNN target
model using lifelong learning. We use this paradigm, as it en-
ables multi-task sequential learning, which saves more memory
space than conventional multi-task learning. We verify this prop-
erty on an emotional speech database, by demonstrating that the
updated atrous CNN model can attack all target models which
have been learnt, and can better attack a new target model than
an attack model trained on one target model only.
Index Terms: Speech Emotion Recognition, Black-box Adver-
sarial Attacks, Transferability, Lifelong Learning
1. Introduction
With the development of artificial intelligence, Speech Emotion
Recognition (SER) has been an essential component of Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) [1, 2] and beyond. Recently, deep
learning has emerged as a promising technique to train more
robust models by extracting highly abstract representations than
conventional machine learning methods on big data [3, 4]. A
range of deep learning topologies have been successfully applied
to the task of SER, such as Convolutional Neural Networks
(CNNs) [5], and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs) [6].
However, according to recent studies, deep learning mod-
els are vulnerable to external adversarial attacks [7], in which
the generated examples have high similarities to the real data.
This naturalness can be achieved by adding minimal and well-
designed perturbations. Moreover, adversarial examples can
make a deep learning model prone to misclassifications. In par-
ticular, adversarial attacks have the potential to be a threat to SER
systems, generating invalid and misinterpreted interactions with
users [8]. For instance, adversarial attacks could even be life-
threatening in the case of the misdiagnosis of emotion-related
mental diseases, e. g., depression [9] and bipolar disorder [10].
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Generating artificial adversarial examples to simulate an at-
tack procedure is an essential step in preventing the real-world
attacks. Such can also help further improve the robustness of tar-
get deep learning models [11]. In this regard, a range of research
works aimed to construct white-box and black-box adversarial
attacks [12, 13]. White-box attacks require the data sources and
complete parameters inside the target model, whereas either data
or parameters are blind in black-box attacks [13]. While white-
box attacks can be guided to generate examples by gradient
descent methods [12], it is challenging to search for black-box
attacks without or with partial knowledge of the target model.
Improving transferability of black-box adversarial attacks
promotes the generation of stronger adversarial data, which can
transfer among different target models [14]. A highly transfer-
able adversarial attack can deceive not only the already disposed
target models but also a new target system [15]. Improving trans-
ferability is also helpful to save costs associated with learning
a unified attacker when compared to training an independent
attacker for each target model. While attacking a target model
is typically viewed as a single task, multi-task learning [16, 17]
optimises an attacker to cheat multiple target models simultane-
ously. However, there is increased time and space complexity
with training multiple tasks. Transfer learning [18] can help fine-
tune an attacker for a new target model with prior knowledge
gained from the previous target; however, the attack model grad-
ually forgets the prior knowledge. Inspired by lifelong learning
paradigms [19], we propose, to the best of the authors’ knowl-
edge, for the first time to improve the transferability of black-box
adversarial attacks by utilising a lifelong learning framework.
Lifelong learning transfers the prior knowledge with a constraint,
so that it is promising to overcome the shortcomings of multi-
task and transfer learning, adapting an attack model for a new
target model with reducing the time and memory, and without
forgetting the prior knowledge.
With this goal in mind, this paper aims to improve the trans-
ferability of untargeted black-box adversarial attacks for deep
SER models. This work has two main contributions. First, a life-
long learning framework is developed to train an attacker for a
sequence of target models. Key results demonstrate that lifelong
learning can effectively improve transferability. Second, perfor-
mances on different target-model orders are compared and anal-
ysed. We observe that target-model sequences (shallow→deep)
require a bigger constraint to the prior knowledge than those
from deep to shallow, as an attacker for a shallow target model
has a stronger transferability than that for a deep one.
2. Related Works
Recently, most studies of adversarial attacks were working on
image processing tasks [20], whereas only a few works focused
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(a) Single-task learning  (b) Multi-task learning       (c) Transfer learning       (d) Lifelong learning
Regularise
Figure 1: The frameworks of the four training methods. (a) The input data is fed into an (A)ttacker to generate fake data as the input of a
(D)efence. (b) An attack model is trained to attack n defence models in one training procedure. (c) The learnt (k)nowledge kt from the
attacker for the t-th defence is transferred to initialise the t+ 1-th attack model. (d) One attack model is trained to deceivce multiple
defences in turn, and the knowledge kt is returned back to regularise the attacker itself.
on adversarial attacks for SER systems. There have been a small
number of works exploring white-box attacks to cheat a SER
model in [8, 21]. A Generative Adversarial Network (GANs)
based approach has also been proposed to generate black-box
fake data [22]. The study in our paper focuses on generating
black-box adversarial data to fool deep SER models.
In the generation of black-box adversarial examples, the
original data is first fed into an attack model, which learns to
output the required perturbations [23]. CNN models have been
utilised as attackers to deceive image processing models [23,
24]. An encoder-decoder CNN was constructed in [23], and
deconvolutional layers were also used to generate fake data
in [24, 25]. In a previous study [26], an atrous CNN has shown a
powerful capability of extracting high-level representations for
audio processing. Our study proposes to generate perturbations
of emotional speech data using an atrous CNN model.
Improving the transferability of adversarial attacks can pro-
mote to train robust deep learning models against practical at-
tacks. Multi-task learning was proposed as an attack technique
in a simultaneous segmentation and depth estimation task [27].
Alternatively, some research works have focused on either an
ensemble of models or an ensemble of inputs [28,29]. For exam-
ple, in [14], an attack model was optimised with an ensemble of
the target models. While in [30], the random transformations of
the original input were fed to the attackers. However, multi-task
learning and ensemble-based methods are time-consuming and
require substantial memory space. Transfer learning and smooth
regularisation on adversarial perturbations have been demon-
strated to solve this problem in [18, 28]. However, it is difficult
to train a transferable attack model, as the prior knowledge is
forgotten in transfer learning. This study investigates to transfer
an attack model across multiple target models with a low time
and space complexity. Lifelong learning [19] is for the first time
employed to learn a transferable adversarial attack model based
on a sequence of target models.
3. Methodology
In this section, the generation of black-box adversarial attacks
using a CNN architecture is first discussed. Then, we introduce
the proposed lifelong learning framework aiming to improve the
transferability of the attacks.
3.1. Black-box Adversarial Attacks
During training a black-box attack model in this study, the pa-
rameters of the target model are unknown for the attacker. The
input data is first fed into the attack model to generate fake data,
which is similar to the original input data (Fig. 1 (a)). The target
model (i. e., defence) then fails to produce correct predictions on
the generated data. In the following subsections, the attack and
defence models are presented respectively.
3.1.1. Attack
Regarding the input, log-Mel spectrograms are utilised due to
their strong performance in the task of SER [8, 31]. The real
log-Mel spectrograms and the labels are denoted as (x, y), and
the generated adversarial data as x′. A CNN model can then be
trained to output two-dimensional adversarial perturbations η.
Finally, the adversarial data is obtained by x′ = x+ η.
An atrous CNN model is proposed to generate the adversar-
ial perturbations due to its ability to output feature maps with
the same size as the input [26]. To effectively train an atrous
CNN attack model, the loss function has two objects: one is to
cheat the defence f , and the other is to minimise the difference
between the fake and real data. Hence, the loss function is a
weighted sum of the loss functions for the two goals:
loss = αlosscla(f(x
′)) + (1− α)lossMSE(x′,x), (1)
losscla(f(x
′)) = max(f(x′)l −max(f(x′)other), 0), (2)
where α is a hyperparameter that balances the two loss functions
losscla and lossMSE . The loss function losscla aims to pull
down the classification performance of defence on the fake data,
and lossMSE aims to improve the similarity of the fake and real
data using Mean Squared Error (MSE). The function losscla is
defined by the difference between the probability of the correct
label l and the maximum probability of other classes. The com-
putation of losscla is referred to as the Carlini-Wagner (C&W)
loss function [32]. This approach has been used to generate
adversarial attacks in image processing tasks [20, 33].
3.1.2. Defence
With the generated adversarial data, the defence model is also
a CNN architecture, as CNNs are suitable for extracting high-
level features from log-Mel spectrograms for classification [26].
As training an attacker is the main focus in this study, the de-
fence models are pre-trained to classify emotional classes, and
employed to help train a highly transferable attack model only.
3.2. Lifelong Learning
While training an attack model, improving the attacker’s capabil-
ity to deceive a new defence or multiple defences is a challenging
task. Training an attack model for one defence can be viewed
as a task, and more defences lead to multiple tasks. Single-
task learning (Fig. 1 (a)) is time consuming, as it learns one
attacker for each target model. Multi-task learning (Fig. 1 (b))
is also enduring and requires a big memory when training an
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Real log-Mel spectrogram 
CNN-4: Anger 0.999    VGG-16: Anger 0.965    ResNet-50: Anger 0.999 
Adversarial perturbation
Fake log-Mel spectrogram   
CNN-4: Guilt 0.377   VGG-16: Sadness 0.991   ResNet-50: Sadness 0.970
Figure 2: The real (bottom), fake (top) log-Mel spectrograms,
and adversarial perturbation (middle) of NP m 19 ang08b.wav.
The three CNN models classify the real data correctly as anger,
but give wrong predictions of guilt or sadness on the fake data.
attacker for multiple defences simultaneously. Transfer learning
approaches ( Fig. 1 (c)) can be used to fine-tune the attacker
for a new defence; however, it results in prior knowledge being
forgotten. Different from the three learning strategies, lifelong
learning (Fig. 1 (d)) trains one attacker for each defence individ-
ually, transferring the prior knowledge back to the attack model
and utilising regularisation in order to retain prior knowledge.
Elastic Weight Consolidation (EWC) [34] is applied in this
study to achieve lifelong learning. The idea of EWC is to give
elastic constraints to the parameters of the current trained model,
optimising the important parameters to be close to those of the
previous model. The important parameters are given high con-
straints, and unimportant parameters are given low constraints.
The importance of each parameter is computed by the diagonal
of the Fisher information matrix [35]. This step is equivalent to
the second derivative of the loss function close to the minimum
value. Hence, applying EWC helps remember the important
parameters while attacking the previous defence, so that the at-
tack model can deceive both the previous and the current target
models. EWC is achieved by adding a regularisation term to the
loss function:
lossewc = loss+ λ
∑
i
Fi(θi − θ∗i )2, (3)
where loss is the loss function of the current attacker computed
by Eq. (1), λ is a hyperparameter deciding the global importance
of the parameters of the attack model for previous defence, and
F denotes the Fisher information matrix. The square of the
difference between the current parameters θ and previous param-
eters θ∗ is minimised to remember θ∗ according to F . Finally,
the regularisation leads to the learning of a new attack model to
fool both target models.
An example of training an attack model using lifelong learn-
ing is shown in Fig. 2. The three CNN models (CNN-4, VGG-16,
and ResNet-50), which were trained on a real emotional speech
data, predict the real log-Mel spectrogram correctly to anger [8].
However, all of the three CNN models fail to predict the correct
emotional label on the adversarial log-Mel spectrogram.
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Database
An Italian emotional speech corpus – the Database of Elicited
Mood in Speech (DEMoS) [36] is used throughout this work.
During recording the speech signals, the subjects’ emotions were
induced by an arousal-valence progression. Totally, 332 neutral
and 9 365 emotional speech samples were collected from 68
speakers (23 females, 45 males). The neutral speech samples
were not considered in the experiments, as neutral is more minor
than other classes. Therefore, this study works on DEMoS with
seven classes: anger, disgust, fear, guilt, happiness, sadness,
and surprise. The data was partitioned speaker-independently
into train, development, and test sets (cf. [8]).
4.2. Experimental Setup
As in [8], the data is resampled into 16 kHz, and then the log-
Mel spectrograms are extracted with a size of (373, 64). As
mentioned in Section 3.1.1, an atrous CNN model is employed
to train an attacker. The atrous CNN model consists of four
convolutional layers with channel numbers of {64, 128, 64, 1},
dilation values of {1, 2, 4, 8}, and a kernel size of (5, 5). Each
convolutional layer is followed by a batch normalisation and a
‘relu’ (for the first three layers) or a ‘sigmoid’ (for the final layer)
function. As the output of the attacker is a minimal adversarial
perturbation, the data values in [0, 1] produced by a ‘sigmoid’
function is more helpful for the optimisation than the data values
in [0,+∞] from a ‘relu’ function. To validate the effectiveness
of the fake data, three pre-trained defence models in [8] are
utilised, including CNN-4, VGG-16, and ResNet-50. These
CNNs have four, 16, and 50 convolutional layers respectively,
and a log-softmax as the final layer for classification.
During training an atrous CNN attack model, the optimiser
is ‘Adam’ with a learning rate of 0.0001, and the training pro-
cedure stops at the 10 000 iterations. To stabilise the training
models, the learning rate is reduced into 90% of its current value
at each 1 000 iterations. The attacker is then trained for 1 000
iterations for a new defence using lifelong learning. The hyper-
parameter is set as α = 0.02 experientially, and λ is optimised
from {1e4, 1e5, 1e6, 1e7} on the development set.
To analyse the effect of defence orders in lifelong learning,
an attacker is trained on two types of defence sequences: one is
going deeper (CNN-4→ VGG-16→ ResNet-50) (i. e., clock-
wise), and the other is going shallower ((ResNet-50→ VGG-16
→ CNN-4)) (i. e., counterclockwise). For each sequence, the
attackers trained on both the first two defences and the whole
sequence are validated to attack the three CNN defences. Fi-
nally, the Unweighted Average Recall (UAR) is utilised as the
evaluation metric with the consideration of class imbalance.
4.3. Results
In the experimental results, Fig. 3 shows the attack performance
of the atrous CNN models on the development set, where a lower
UAR value is corresponding to a stronger attacker. We can see
that, in each defence sequence, a bigger value of λ leads to more
constraint to the parameters of the attacker, so that more prior
knowledge from the previous target model is remembered. For
example, in the clockwise sequence, the attack model can better
fool CNN-4 with λ increasing. While comparing the attackers
trained on two target models, the attacker in the clockwise se-
quence performs better on the third model ResNet-50 than the
attacker in the counterclockwise sequence working on CNN-4.
This indicates that a shallow target model helps train a more
transferable attacker than a deep one. In this regard, remember-
ing more prior knowledge of a shallow attack model is necessary
to improve the attack transferability. To perform well on all three
defences, the attacker trained on the clockwise sequence requires
a bigger value of λ (1e6 on the two-defence sequence, and 1e5
on three) than that on the counterclockwise sequence (1e4 on the
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Figure 3: The performances of lifelong learning with different λ values on the development set. The attack models are trained on the four
sequences of target models (bottom), and the transferability is tested on three target models (CNN-4, VGG-16, and ResNet-50).
Table 1: The performance comparison of four learning methods on the (dev)elopment and test sets. The attackers are learnt on different
defence sequences, and then the generated fake data are ultilised to attack the three target models (CNN-4, VGG-16, and ResNet-50).
CNN-4 VGG-16 ResNet-50
Method UAR [%] Dev. Test Dev. Test Dev. Test
Single-task learning CNN-4 28.5 21.9 47.5 46.1 39.3 54.5ResNet 68.8 56.0 49.7 42.1 20.0 20.7
Multi-task learning
CNN-4 + VGG-16 29.4 23.0 21.8 17.9 31.5 49.1
ResNet-50 + VGG-16 63.5 52.6 24.0 19.8 21.2 22.9
CNN-4 + VGG-16 + ResNet-50 33.1 28.0 22.9 18.5 21.0 23.9
Transfer learning
CNN-4 + VGG-16 45.2 48.6 19.3 16.1 30.8 54.7
CNN-4 + VGG-16 + ResNet-50 52.7 41.4 30.7 28.8 18.5 18.9
ResNet-50 + VGG-16 59.3 53.0 22.9 18.1 25.1 37.6
ResNet-50 + VGG-16 + CNN-4 24.9 22.0 30.2 29.0 24.0 34.2
Lifelong learning
CNN-4 + VGG-16 34.6 30.1 31.4 29.7 32.5 46.9
CNN-4 + VGG-16 + ResNet-50 39.2 38.5 25.0 26.4 24.5 33.4
ResNet-50 + VGG-16 64.7 54.1 27.4 21.7 29.5 36.3
ResNet-50 + VGG-16 + CNN-4 43.3 33.9 31.6 29.4 28.8 30.9
two-defence sequence, and 1e5 on three). Finally, both attack
models trained on the whole of two sequences can successfully
fool the three target models.
Further, the results of lifelong learning are compared to the
other three learning frameworks in Table 1. Single-task learning
performs the worst on new target models as the attack model
learnt from one target model has a low transferability. Multi-task
learning trains the most transferable attack model to deceive
the three target models, but it is time and space consuming as
aforementioned. While using transfer learning, the attack model
forgets the prior knowledge during fine-tuning, especially in the
results of the clockwise sequences. Compared to transfer learn-
ing, lifelong learning trains the attack model with remembering
the prior knowledge, so that the attacker can cheat all target
models which have been trained on.
Moreover, while comparing the results of two types of
sequences using transfer and lifelong learning, lifelong learn-
ing performs better than transfer learning on the clockwise se-
quences, and the performances on the counterclockwise using
lifelong learning are comparable with those by transfer learning.
This is in consistency with the aforementioned analysis, which
is that the attackers trained on the clockwise sequences require
more constraint than those on the counterclockwise sequences,
because a shallower target model leads to a more transferable
attacker. Transfer learning can be viewed as a special case of life-
long learning without constraint, so that it adapts the attacker to
fool shallow defence models in the counterclockwise sequences,
remembering less prior knowledge from deep defences than typ-
ical lifelong learning. Although the order of target models can
affect the attack performance, it is always unknown how deep
a new defence is in practical. Therefore, it is difficult to train a
transferable attack model using transfer learning when the new
target model is shallower than the existed defences. Hence, life-
long learning can help the attack model adapt to fool the new
target model and the target models which have been learnt on.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In summary, we trained an atrous Convolutional Neural Network
(CNN) as a black-box adversarial attack model, and improved
its transferability using lifelong learning. The proposed life-
long learning framework trained the attack model successfully
cheating the three CNN classifiers of CNN-4, VGG-16, and
ResNet-50. Further, the effect of different defence orders was
analysed, discovering that a sequence from shallow to deep mod-
els needs a bigger constraint than an inverse one.
In future efforts, more lifelong learning methods will be
investigated to further improve the transferability, and more
defences will be utilised to test the transferability of attackers. As
the attackers in this study generated a corresponding adversarial
perturbation for a real data, universal black-box attacks will
be focused on to generate a universal perturbation for all real
data. Lifelong learning will be further applied to improve the
transferability of universal black-box adversarial attacks.
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